In the recent fair use art case Cariou v. Prince 
I. INTRODUCTION In 2009, portrait photographer Patrick Cariou sued renowned appropriation artist Richard Prince, accusing Prince of stealing Cariou's copyrighted portraits of Jamaican Rastafarians for use in a series of paintings by Prince collectively titled "Canal Zone."' Cariou also sued Manhattan gallery owner Larry Gagosian for showing Prince's work, arguing that Gagosian had breached his duty to ensure that Prince had complied with copyright law.
2 At trial, Prince admitted to using Cariou's photos without his permission, but claimed fair use under the Copyright Act, which traditionally allows for limited use of a copyrighted work without an author's permission "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research." Prince's lawyers argued that the message behind the use of Cariou's photos in "Canal Zone" was so different from Cariou's message in the original portraits that Prince had transformed their meaning and therefore created new art.
Prince and Gagosian lost spectacularly on summary judgment. Relying largely on Prince's inability to communicate to the court an artistic intent distinct from Cariou's, Judge Batts of the Southern District of New York found against Prince and Gagosian
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THE DESTRUCTIVE IMPULSE OF FAIR USE on every work of "Canal Zone" and ordered all unsold paintings in the series delivered to Cariou for disposition as he saw fit, including destruction.
But under a new fair use standard announced by a divided Second Circuit panel at his appeal, depending not on the artist's ability to communicate his intent, but rather the reasonable observer's understanding of that intent, 4 Prince emerged mostly victorious: all but five of the paintings were declared fair use, with the remaining works remanded to Judge Batts for reconsideration under the new standard. Should Judge Batts once again find infringement, the panel warned her that destruction as a remedy would be "improper and against the public interest."
5
To judge from the single footnote it devoted to the issue, the Second Circuit's opposition to court-ordered destruction of art might be fairly interpreted as sui generis to Prince. The panel gave no rationale for its position beyond "all parties' agreement at oral argument that the destruction of Prince's artwork" alone should be forbidden.6 Considering the comments at oral argument of Judge Parker of the Second Circuit panel, who observed that destruction "seems like something that would appeal to the Huns or the Taliban," 7 the panel may have even felt a certain selfsatisfaction for rescuing Prince's paintings from the furnace's maws. Yet, the Second Circuit's decision in Prince may have far more destructive impact on art than Judge Batts's own.
This article explains how Judge Batts's order of destruction perversely incentivized more copyright infringement-and, arguably, more art. First, it examines the two Prince decisions and notes how under either of the fair use standards applied, destruction-either symbolic or literal-contemporary art is the inevitable outcome. The district court's fair use analysis hinged on Prince's inability to articulate an artistic intent that would sufficiently distinguish it from Cariou's such that it would qualify DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol. XXIV:1 as new expression rather than unauthorized derivative use of a copyrighted image. But in much contemporary art, the artist's refusal to articulate an identifiable intent is the point of the work. The district court's standard therefore forces the artist to choose between symbolic destruction of an intentionally ambiguous work in order to win her case or literal destruction of the work upon losing.
Surprisingly, despite its stated opposition to destruction of art, that very outcome may be even more likely to occur under the Second Circuit's revised fair use standard. At first glance, the Second Circuit's decision appears to pluck the artist from the horns of the dilemma imposed by the district court. It retreats from artistic intent as the sine qua non of a fair use defense, an appropriate move in light of contemporary art's skepticism of an artist-dominated, intentional message. But it replaces artistic intent with a reasonable observer standard that is so malleable and subjective that it robs the law of clarity necessary to advise artists of the legality of their work and conditions the outcome of future fair use suits on an individual judge's artistic interpretations. That uncertainty becomes destructive when combined with the Second Circuit's approval of the district court's expansion of liability to patrons that show an artist's work. The lack of a clear standard of infringement combined with pressure from patrons to avoid artistic choices that may incur legal liability provides a powerful incentive for artists to stop creating certain forms of contemporary art-even if that art, once created, would have been found legal in court. The district court's standard would destroy existing art in its completed form, but the Second Circuit's standard would destroy art in its formative stages.
This counterintuitive result stems from the Second Circuit's failure to adequately consider the effects of court-ordered destruction of limited edition works of art challenged in an infringement suit. The aftermath of Prince demonstrates how court-ordered destruction, far from protecting the plaintiffs market for his original work by wiping an infringing derivative image from existence, can instead encourage reproduction of infringing images in media, increase the secondary market value of companion works of art from the same infringing series, and provide substantial publicity and artistic cachet to the "outlaw"
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[Vol. XXIV:1 frequently depends on taking published images and presenting them with little or no modification and therefore lacks the traditional physical indicia of transformation. It has emerged as a ubiquitous and influential force in contemporary art, even more potent in an age of effortless transfer of online images; but its existence is threatened by copyright law. The facts of Prince and the arguments of its parties, summarized in Part III, present the latest iteration of the conflict between appropriation and copyright. These facts undergird the analysis of the two conflicting court decisions that follow. Part IV summarizes relevant portions of the district court's decision in Cariou v. Prince and explains why the district court's fair use standard and infringement remedy would leave many contemporary conceptual artists on the horns of a dilemma: destroy your work by defining its meaning or destroy your work by losing the case. Part V then explains how the Second Circuit's decision, while eliminating the district court's impossible choice, nonetheless imposes other destructive outcomes. By muddling the standard for fair use and approving liability for artistic patrons, the Second Circuit greatly increases ex-ante pressure to stop creating certain types of art at all, even if that art would eventually be found perfectly legal. Part VI supplements the Second Circuit's analysis with an investigation of destruction as a remedy for infringement by limited edition works of art. It argues that destruction of limited edition art frustrates copyright's primarily economic-based regulatory scheme. By increasing the value and cachet of forbidden works, destruction as a remedy perversely incentivizes more infringement. It also encourages reproductions of the infringing work by art world 
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THE DESTRUCTIVE IMPULSE OF FAIR USE sympathizers and legal analysts, who will continue to recreate and look upon the destroyed image as a marker of what fair use is not and what future artists must do to avoid legal liability. Had the Second Circuit more adequately examined the effects of courtordered destruction, its decision might have used these insights to provide a principled basis to avoid destruction of art in future fair use controversies likely to emerge under a legal standard more ambiguous than ever.
II. COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE, AND TRANSFORMATIVENESS
This section provides a brief overview of copyright law concepts necessary to understand the holdings in the Prince cases. It begins with an introduction to copyright and its purposes. It then explains how the fair use doctrine functions as a defense to copyright infringement. It focuses particularly on transformative use, which asks if an alleged infringer has sufficiently transformed the message or meaning of an original work of art such that his use of it in a secondary work qualifies as a fair use exception to copyright infringement.
Copyright's ultimate aim is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 9 To do so, it provides creators of original works with a "special reward" for their labor: a temporary monopoly on the use and reproduction of their creation, which an author may sell to another during the life of the copyright.' 0 Copyright law is therefore grounded in the presumption that the economic benefits attached to a monopoly will continuously motivate original creation." Similarly, its primary objective is the vindication of an
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author's economic rights; until relatively recently,1 2 moral rightsentitling an author to object to distortion or mutilation of his work on the basis of personal disagreement with the alteration-fell outside of American copyright's ambit, and in American law they continue to be less robust than those offered in other countries.' The monopoly granted by copyright cannot be absolute, however, because all "original" creation borrows advances made by others and uses them as constituent elements of a new work.14 Important advances in material and social sciences depend on the ability to explicitly reference past works: scientific theorems build upon one another, historians and anthropologists make use of utilitarian "conviction" of the Copyright Clause, arguing that "no evidence suggests that Cariou's decision to create, collect, and distribute his photographs would be influenced by the bare possibility that another artist might happen upon his book years later and license those images to create other works of art." Reply Brief of the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Urging Reversal at *10, Cariou v. Prince, 11-1197-CV (2d Cir. Feb 29, 2012), 2013 WL 1760521. Although the Foundation's brief argued solely for a finding of fair use in Prince, its assertion "that the possibility [of use of one's image by another artist] is simply too remote to have any plausible effect on the decision of Cariou (or anyone else) to create or not create" resonates in the larger debate over the validity of copyright's animating principles. Id.; see also infra note 177 (contesting the validity of the economic incentive rationale for creation).
12. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA"), 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2013). VARA, amended to the Copyright Statue in 1990, provides artists with the moral rights of "integrity" and "paternity" to their works: the right to object to intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of work, and a right to attribution of that work. Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016] The fair use doctrine embodies this balance. It draws a line between unauthorized infringement of copyright-"stealing" another's work and passing it off as one's own-and legitimate use of another's work to facilitate new, useful creation-"borrowing" another's insights in the name of progress.16 The doctrine developed symbiotically with copyright in British common law, with copyright making room for the expansion of fair use whenever it was deemed beneficial to progress in science and art.
17
Early fair use questions examined the propriety of publishing abridgments of a pre-existing work.' 8 While merely shortening a pre-existing work was said to violate copyright, the "invention, learning, and judgment" shown in abridgements, combined with their "extremely useful"l 9 purpose of making scientific and cultural knowledge more accessible, 2 0 could be properly said to qualify abridgements as new works, justifying an exemption from infringement liability.21 (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; copyright for a derivative work rests with the owner of the original work. Id. § 106(2).
15.
22. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Justice Storey wrote: "In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." Id.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2013).
24. Id. The "such as" modifier preceding the list of activities could be reasonably interpreted as confining fair use to activities similar to those listed. Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016] 
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 26 As with the preamble's suggested uses, the factors listed are theoretically non-exhaustive, though no court has developed or applied new factors. Under the first factor, the nature and purpose of the secondary work of art, modem courts often ask how "transformative" the secondary creator's use was: Did the secondary creator employ the copied material for a different purpose or in a different manner than the original creator? 28 Transformative use as a conceptual underpinning of the purpose and character inquiry gained hold after the publication of a 1990 Harvard Law Review Article by then-Southern District of New York, now Second Circuit Judge Pierre Leval. 29 Leval considered the first factor to lie "at the heart of the fair user's case," 30 but bemoaned the lack of decisionmaking guidance inherent in open-ended terms such as the "purpose and character" of a work.
3 1 He therefore sought to provide "consensus on the meaning of fair use" 32 and its prongs, leveraging his considerable experience as a presiding judge in copyright controversies in a New York courtroom. 
DEPAUL J ART, TECH & IP LAW
Leval reasoned that analysis of the purpose and character prong "turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative." 33 A transformative use is one that "adds value to the original"; it uses the primary author's work "as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings." 34 In contrast, a secondary use that "merely repackages or republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test." 35 Similarly, mere adaptation of a work into a new mode of presentation-say, from a book to a movie-is not enough; that makes the work derivative under copyright rather than transformative under fair use leaving it properly under the copyright of the original author.
36
Leval's article set forth certain paradigmatic examples of transformative use, including critique, parody, symbolism, and aesthetic declaration.
37
But already at its origins, transformativeness emerges slippery. As Leval's list of examples of transformative use progresses, it progressively undermines his quest for clarity: what is transformative symbolism? The exact same photograph of a political candidate, depending on whether it appears on the cover of a left-or right-leaning publication, will symbolize hope to some, despair to others, and perhaps just a paycheck to the photographer. Should use of the photograph therefore be unrestricted, depriving the original photographer of any right to compensation for his work? What is an "aesthetic declaration" and what does it mean to make one that transforms a work? Should the thought "This image would look better with an Instagram filter" suffice to justify copying and disseminating it as 
[Vol. XXIV:1I
12 DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016] Inc.39 and is now regularly used as a guiding framework for analysis under fair use's first prong. 40 I this framework, "the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors,"41 meaning analysis of the first factor often influences the answer to the entire fair use question. A finding of non-transformative use under the first factor may therefore be decisive in a fair use defense. 4 2
III. THE CHALLENGE TO COPYRIGHT BY APPROPRIATION ART IN
CARIOU V. PRINCE
Copyright economically incentivizes artistic production by guaranteeing an artist the right to profits from the sale of her original work or copies of it. But what happens when one of the most celebrated innovations in contemporary art is defined by the very act of copying work from another artist, with minimal alteration, and presenting it in a different context? This section presents appropriation art's challenge to copyright's centuries-old prong of the first § 107 factor weighs heavily against a finding of fair use.").
13
DEPAULJ ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol. XXIV:1 model. The problem is not a new one, and has been discussed extensively. 43 The bulk of this section is therefore dedicated to the facts set forth and arguments made in Cariou v. Prince, the case under which the Second Circuit issued its newly revised fair use standard. Appropriation artists,44 continuing in the line of conceptual artists whose work heralded the death of the Romantic notion of genius creators 45 "do not strive for magical or 'creative' transmutations" that would ordinarily guide a court to a finding of transformativeness.46 In appropriation art "the creative element virtually disappears" 47 in favor of a focus "on the notion of recontextualizing an original and on what the original means." 4 8 Changing the context of a work of art elicits and encourages different questions and reactions than those apparent in the original context. When context shapes meaning, each particular viewer, in each particular location, is implicated in the assignment of meaning. Sherrie Levine's celebrated work "After Walker Evans," for example, consisted entirely of re-photographs of Evans's Depression-era photographs of impoverished, rural Americans. Levine presented the photographs without any alterations to the original, save for a change in the artist's name. Observing a secondary work of art that is a complete replica of the original fairly evokes the reaction: "What's the point?" But Levine leaves that answer to the viewer herself, and an abundance of rich, personal interpretations have filled that void, making the work 43. See supra note 8 (listing secondary literature discussion on the conflict between appropriation art and copyright).
44. "'Appropriation' covers a broad array of practices-reworking, sampling, quoting, borrowing, remixing, transforming, adapting-that focus on one person taking something that another has created and embracing it as his or her own." Barbara Pollack, Copy Rights, ARTNEWS (Mar. 22, 2012) 
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THE DESTRUCTIVE IMPULSE OF FAIR USE simultaneously undefinable and universally defined. 4 9 Today, consumers of art are hardpressed to enter a contemporary art gallery or museum without its own appropriation art on display 5 o and appropriation itself is a standard tool of a younger generation of Internet-based creators.
1
Overbroad application of copyright law, the argument goes, threatens to stifle what has become a vital and ubiquitous force in contemporary art. 
A. The Facts and Arguments in
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[Vol. XXIV:1 month run, the gallery sold eight of the paintings to private buyers for a total of $10,480,000 and exchanged seven for other artworks valued between $6 and $8 million.
56
Sales of copies of the exhibition catalogue netted an additional $6,784.57 At the exhibition's termination, the unsold paintings were placed in storage, out of public view. 5 8
The photos of Rastafari that Prince had used in "Canal Zone" were torn from an out-of-print book of original photography by Patrick Cariou, titled "Yes Rasta." Prince did little more than paint blue lozenges over the subject's eyes and mouth, and paste a picture of a guitar over the subject's body." 60 Cariou had registered the images in "Yes Rasta" with the United States Copyright Office in 2001.61 Months before the "Canal Zone" exhibition, Cariou had been in talks with a Manhattan gallery to exhibit photos. However, there is conflicting testimony as to whether the photos were from "Yes Rasta" or another Cariou project 62 -for sale for between $3,000 and $20,000 each, and to reprint the book for signing.63 Around that same time, Cariou learned of Prince's show when alerted by a friend who had seen a newspaper advertisement that reproduced some of the paintings. Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016] 
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The Manhattan gallery owner in talks with Cariou also took notice of the "Canal Zone" exhibition, and quickly scrapped tentative plans to show Cariou's work. The gallery owner gave conflicting testimony to both artists' lawyers as to why she broke off talks: Cariou's lawyers contend that her decision was motivated out of concerns that she would be seen as "capitalizing on Prince's success and notoriety" and "exhibit[ing] work which had been 'done already."' 65 Prince's lawyers allege that she "went with another artist due to timing constraints because Cariou did not respond for months to her attempts to reach him."
66
It is undisputed, however, that after Cariou sent Prince and the Gagosian gallery a cease-and-desist letter, the exhibition continued to run. In January 2009, Cariou sued Prince and Gagosian for copyright infringement, 67 alleging that the "Canal Zone" paintings incorporated images from "Yes Rasta" without his permission and in violation of his copyright. His requested relief included a permanent injunction against displaying, selling, or distributing originals or copies of "Canal Zone," damages related to violation of the infringement (including all of the profits Prince and Gagosian had made from sale of "Canal Zone" images), delivery to Cariou of all copies of "Canal Zone" paintings for "impounding, destruction, or other disposition" as he determined, and notice to any owners of "Canal Zone" paintings that their works could not lawfully be displayed under the Copyright Act.
68
At trial, Prince acknowledged incorporating "Yes Rasta" images into "Canal Zone" without Cariou's permission, but claimed fair use. Banking on a finding of transformativeness, Prince's lawyers cited his "genuine creative rationale to convey new insights, a different purpose and new meaning" above and beyond Cariou's in "Yes Rasta."69 They repeatedly referred to Cariou's photographs DEPAULI ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol. XXIV:1 as "raw elements," 70 akin to the paint Prince had applied to some of the images or the canvases to which he had squeegeed them, arguing that Prince transformed the "Yes Rasta" photographs into ''a completely new expression and a different message that had nothing to do with" Cariou's originals.
The different message itself varied between three themes, according to Prince's lawyers. First, they claimed that "Canal Zone" functioned as an homage to artists that Prince admired. They characterized the use of collaged large hands and paint over the faces of Cariou's photos as artistic choices made in honor of master and modem painters de Kooning, Cezanne, Warhol and Picasso. 72 Second, they contended that the redemptive power of music was a central focus of the work, as expressed through the addition of guitars to Cariou's images of Rastafari men in verdant scenery, creating "a fantastical, post-apocalyptical world where all that remained was music and the bands to play it." 73 The message of redemptive music was also generalized to a "contemporary take on the music scene having nothing to do with Rastafarians in their Jamaican landscape." 7 4 Finally, Prince's "groupings of men and men, men and women, and women and women as musical bands" was intended "to connote equality between the sexes." 7 5
Although not framed explicitly as an argument for fair use, Prince's lawyers used the "Factual Background" of his Brief in Support of Summary Judgment to place both Prince and the "Canal Zone" paintings within the larger context of appropriation art, invoking artists Marcel Duchamp, Andy Warhol, Pablo Picasso, Georges Braque, Jasper Johns, Robert Rauschenberg, Sherrie Levine, Salvador Dali, and Jeff Koons as progenitors and contemporaries to Prince in the appropriation art movement, 76 which they characterized as "an established art form that has been 70. Id at 1, 15, 17, 18 
18
18
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A. The District Court Decision
After motion practice, Judge Batts of the Southern District of New York ruled all thirty of the "Canal Zone" images at issue to be infringing works, as assessed under the four-factor test for fair use. Devoting the bulk of her analysis to the first prong, purpose and character of the use and applying the transformative framework, Judge Batts held that a transformative purpose or character under fair use "imposes a requirement that the new work in some way comment on, relate to the historical context of, or critically refer back to the original works." 84 Citing Prince's deposition testimony that he didn't "really have a message" with "Canal Zone," 85 Judge Batts had little trouble finding that "Prince did not intend to comment on Cariou, on Cariou's Photos, or on aspects of popular culture closely associated with Cariou or the Photos," 86 and had therefore not engaged in transformative use.
Further supporting the district court's legal conclusion on tranformativeness was Judge Batts's impression that Prince had done "vanishingly little" to physically transform Cariou's work, using entire or unaltered photographs.
Even where Cariou's photos "played a comparatively minor role" in a "Canal Zone" painting-those in which Prince did not use complete or unaltered Cariou photographs-Judge Batts contended that the Prince paintings still "feature [d] 
20
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DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016] Gagosian, too, was found directly liable for copyright infringement, for two independently sufficient reasons. First, he had prepared and distributed the exhibition catalogue and other marketing materials bearing "Canal Zone" images.
94
In other words, Gagosian himself was an artist who had created the exhibition catalogue by using copyrighted images. In addition, Gagosian had exhibited and sold infringing works. Of note here is that Judge Batts would have imposed direct liability even if Gagosian had done nothing but provide a space for Prince to show his works. Under Judge Batts's theory of direct liability, the patron's guilt proceeds automatically from the artist's.
Second, Judge Batts also found Gagosian liable for vicarious and contributory infringement.
95
Vicarious liability is present where the "defendant has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities." 96 Gagosian's profits from the sale were sufficient proof of a direct financial interest. Relying on Prince's testimony that Gagosian handled the marketing for his exhibition and on Gagosian's proximity to Prince during the early stages of the "Canal Zone" paintings, 98 Judge Batts held that Gagosian had not only the right and ability to supervise Prince's work, but the Contributory liability attaches when " [o] ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another;" it subdivides into a requirement of knowledge and a requirement of material contribution. 100 Gagosian's knowledge, in this case, came from Prince's well-known "reputation as an appropriation artist who rejects the constricts of copyright law."' 0 ' Given that reputation, Judge Batts found a duty to inquire into Prince's compliance with copyright law in "Canal Zone" that Gagosian had ignored.' 0 2 He therefore either knew or should have known of the infringement. Material contribution to infringement came from Gagosian's advertising and marketing of the exhibition.'
03
Finding both defendants liable under copyright law, Judge Batts enjoined Prince and Gagosian from further infringement of Cariou's copyrights, ordering them to "deliver up for impounding, destruction, or other disposition, as Plaintiff determines," all unsold works from the "Canal Zone" series. 104 
B. The Destructive Outcome of the "Comment on" Standard
Judge Batts's narrow conception of transformative use offered Prince two options: defend the work as meaning-laden commentary imbued with an intentional message controlled by the artist or lose the case. Those options will present many conceptual contemporary artists with an impossible choice, because in their work the lack of a unitary message imparted by a godlike author may be the entire point. Many contemporary artists seek to escape the constraints of didactic authorship and its duty to impart an identifiable message to a waiting audience. For these artists, the "goal is always to produce disorientation and doubt." Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016] 
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National Gallery of Art curator James Meyer describes the quest to "produce an art devoid of an author" as "the collective fantasy, the grail, of the American neo-avant garde."l 06 The death of the author has been a recurring theme of conceptual art at least since Marcel Duchamp signed a urinal and christened it "Fountain" for an exhibition with the American Society of Independent Artists. 10 7 Duchamp's "readymade" sculptures were, in reality, nothing more than manufactured objects that he had selected, devoid of aesthetic criteria, and labeled "art." 108 The act of creating art in the absence of technical mastery shifted the nature of art from the physical to the conceptual: As Duchamp expressed it, "I wanted to get away from the physical aspect of painting . . . I wanted to put painting once more at the service of the mind."l09 Duchamp's conceptual framework was adopted and expanded by later twentieth century artists. Yves Klein's "The Void" featured his "invisible" paintings, exhibited in a whitewashed gallery, empty of all furniture. 110 Thousands lined up to see what one reviewer characterized as "a void to fill with dreams." 1 1 Andy Warhol dubbed his studio the Factory, alluding to the advent of mechanized, industrial reproduction as a legitimate process of artistic creation. The Factory churned out silk-screened images of supermarket soup cans and megawatt celebrities, using the techniques of mass production to transform the ubiquitous imagery of marketing into art. Warhol captured the essence of the modem dismantling of authorship by stating "I think somebody should be able to do all my paintings for me." 1 1 2 Later, conceptual photographers like Richard Prince would take photographs of photographs, exhibiting secondary works that were physically indiscernible from the originals, but capable of evoking dramatically different reactions. In the nineteen eighties, Prince
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rephotographed magazine ads featuring the Marlboro man, the famous symbol of frontier virility engineered by a Chicago advertising agency. 113 Prince's work defies a unified interpretation: Is it a biting commentary of manufactured machismo? A study on the uncertain division between reproduction and original creation? An attack on the notion that art must be created by a mysteriously doted artist? A reaffirmation that the artist's magical hand can transform the mundane into the majestic?
Diffuse in subject matter and media, these artists all used minimal physical skill to create art in service of the mind, art that demands engagement from the viewer in order to discern its meaning. For the entire history of human art, the physical skill of the creative artist had reduced the viewer to automaton, commanding him to feel whatever the author intended to convey: sadness, terror, jubilation. In contrast, contemporary artists that strive "to erase all authorship from their work radically deny the notion of 'creative authorship' as a principle and as a definitional codification for works of art." At this moment, who is the artist? Whose work gives the art its "true" meaning? What exactly is that meaning? The questions are intentionally unanswerable, precisely because the innumerable, individual meanings that proliferate when viewers aren't constrained by an artist's interpretation of her own work-when they aren't told the meaning of what they see-become the artist's own message.116 
The Marlboro Man
A. The Second Circuit Decision
From the beginning of its divided opinion, the Second Circuit demonstrated a reverence both for Prince the artist and his artistic efforts in "Canal Zone" that was noticeably at odds with the district court. While Judge Batts had sardonically referred to Prince as an "appropriation artist" 124 (quotations included) that had done "vanishingly little" to transform Cariou's works, the Second Circuit described Prince as "a leading exponent" 
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Zone" arguably lacked any of those indicia. Something more, though related, seems to be at work in the differences between the Southern District and Second Circuit decisions. When a defendant does "vanishingly little," his claim of artistry is met with skepticism; but when he "alter[s] . . . significantly," his status as leading proponent of an art movement is both relevant and informative. Notwithstanding the emphatic rejection of "sweat of the brow" as a justifying principle of copyright law,131 the question of Prince's effort seem to have played more than a passing role in the two courts' different outcomes, a troubling trend when considering the decreasing prominence of physical skill in much contemporary art.
With the introductory tone of its opinion already sharply in contrast to the District Court's, the Second Circuit diverges even farther from Judge Batts in its legal analysis. The panel's legal discussion began with a focus on the protection of new creation, noting first and foremost that " [t] he purpose of the copyright law is '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"'l 32 and that overbroad application of copyright "protection would stifle, rather than advance" that purpose.1 33 Grounded in the language of progress, the Second Circuit disagreed with the trial court's requirement that a secondary work comment on the original or its author in order to be transformative, and held instead that "to But she is also perfectly free to ignore it, as the Second Circuit majority did.
138
Applying this legal standard to "Canal Zone," the Second Circuit found that "twenty-five of Prince's artworks" were transformative because they "manifest an entirely different aesthetic from Cariou's photographs." 137. Id. at 707 (stating that an explanation by Prince of the meaning of his work "might have lent strong support to his defense").
138. Id. "Prince's work could be transformative even without commenting on Cariou's work or on culture, and even without Prince's stated intention to do so." Id.
139. Prince, 714 F.3d at 707. 140. Id. at 711. 14 1. Id. 142. Id. at n. 5.
28
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143
Visiting Judge Wallace's partial concurrence sharply criticized the majority for deciding the fair use question on only some of the paintings, accusing them of "short-circuit[ing the] search for a just result under the law." 1 44 Judge Wallace failed to find "a principled reason for remanding to the district court only the five works" 1 4 5 and would have remanded the entire Canal Zone series for reappraisal under the Second Circuit's new legal standard. Selectively deciding the fair use question for only some of the paintings amounted to nothing more than the court "employ[ing] its own artistic judgment"l 46 of Cariou's and Prince's works.
B. Transformation in the Eye of the Beholding Judge: the "New Aesthetic" Standard
The Second Circuit's reasonable observer, unguided by nothing more than the naked eye, could spot the different aesthetic in twenty-five of Prince's paintings, making those paintings transformative. But an equally reasonable observer could disagree with the basic notion that a new aesthetic alone falls properly under new expression, meaning, or message.
What is the difference in meaning between the Technicolor and black-andwhite version of Tumbir is a blogging platform that allows users to share text, photos, links, videos, and other content. Tumblr users can share information from websites or other Tumbir profiles and
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Ignoring these questions, the Second Circuit's reasonable observer takes it for granted that physical transformation to aesthetic is a transformation in meaning.
14 8 Because Prince's "composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and media"-physical characteristics, all-"are fundamentally different and new compared to the photographs" so, too, "is the expressive nature of Prince's work." 149 These additional descriptors of Prince's new aesthetic only muddle the concept further: Does a new expressive nature require changes to all of the physical characteristics mentioned or only some of them? Is a change to one alone enough?
For that matter, will changes to all of those characteristics always impart new meaning? Consider a pirated copy of a film recorded by hand on a digital camera in a theater and then sold on the street as a DVD. Undoubtedly the pirated copy changes the presentation (theater to small screen), scale (big to small), color palette (vibrant to muted), and media (film to digital) of the original. Arguably the introduction of the cameraman's choice of angle or the sound of audience reactions introduce new creative elements, altering the composition. Fair use? And what of the court's continued insistence that "a derivative work that merely presents the same material but in a new form, such as a book of synopses of televisions [sic] shows, is follow their friend's Tumbir profiles. Tumblr mixes original content, such as comments and pictures from the actual Tumblr user, with found content, like photos and videos from the internet, but focuses on the latter. Tumblr shifted the trend in social media websites from primarily original content to primarily found content by making it easy and quick to share things found online. Id. at 10.
148. Amicus Curiae the Andy Warhol Foundation, arguing in favor of a reversal of the district court decision, similarly begged the form/meaning question. "The dramatic contrast in expression creates an equally dramatic contrast in message and meaning. There is simply no escaping the fact that Prince's work is dramatically different than Cariou's in expression, meaning and message." Reply Brief of the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Urging Reversal at 3, Cariou v. Prince 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), 2013 WL 1760521, at *2. Neither Prince nor the Warhol Foundation attempted to explain why a change in expression must produce a change in meaning. See id.
149. Prince, 714 F.3d at 706.
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DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016] changes to the photographs would necessarily constitute fair use."' 5 1 In other words, there is a floor to aesthetic change, below which an artist can't descend without engaging in copyright infringement.
Unfortunately, nothing in the opinion states explicitly what that floor is. Instead, it must be teased from the Second Circuit's decision to remand five of the Canal Zone paintings to Judge Batts for a determination as to whether they are fair or infringing use. Within those five paintings lies some indication of the floor that they barely graze, either from above or below.
Judge Wallace critiqued the remand of the five paintings alone as unprincipled.
But depending on Judge Batts's new determination, the remand could bring deeper complications. The five paintings did not qualify for fair use at the appellate level because the minimal alterations that Prince made to them merely "moved the work in a different direction from Cariou's"l 52 and "change [d] (describing Prince as the exemplar of the appropriation art tradition and quoting reviews of Prince's work that alternately describe it as "an invitation to think anew of an already accepted realty" and "provocative"). Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016] 
See also
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THE DESTRUCTIVE IMPULSE OF FAIR USE
testimony be an appropriate basis upon which to decide fair use? To hew too closely to Judge Wallace's emphasis on expert opinion seems to read into the Second Circuit's "reasonable observer" standard an additional qualifier, noticeably absent from the majority opinion: the reasonable art-critic observer. Surely Judge Wallace does not believe it unreasonable to arrive at an aesthetic determination of a work of art absent the insight or extra knowledge that comes with a degree in art history. Yet it seems similarly unsettling to insist too strongly that it is properly a judge's role alone to decide whether a particular piece of art belongs to a new aesthetic movement or expression. 
C. The Destructive Outcome ofPatron Liability
For all the handwringing over the appellate court's unclear fair use standard, a certain amount of ambiguity is inherent in the doctrine, which depends not on bright line rules but individualized, context-specific determinations.161 The less obvious flaw with the Second Circuit's opinion, then, may be approval of infringement liability for not just artists themselves, but artistic patrons. That expansion did not go unnoticed, however, by national contemporary art museums and foundations, who jointly submitted an amicus brief in the appeal signed by The equally weighty burdens on non-similarly situated institutions isn't just a cause for sympathy for the small gallerist: it is injurious to emerging artists as well, whose work must show somewhere if it is to gain the art world acclaim and attention of millionaires that Richard Prince enjoys.
The amicus brief submitted by the museums argued that the district court's direct liability standard "could effectively deter museums from obtaining or displaying Appropriation Art;"l70 how much truer is that for community galleries in mixed-income neighborhoods, where younger, innovative artists typically live, work, and show? How will direct liability for patrons deter the creation and exhibition of avant-garde art that, as a genre, has yet to be tested by any legal standard? What innovations beyond collaged appropriation will the new liability standard squelch?
And even if large museums alone have the money to legally vet all appropriation art acquisitions, why would they? All things being equal, why not acquire other art that is less expensive to exhibit? Why not exclusively market exhibitions that have no chance of bringing infringement liability to the museum? What effect would this have on the culture's acceptance and appreciation of appropriation art? The purpose of copyright, as the Second Circuit's opinion in Prince dutifully reminds us, is " [t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. . . ."171 If we were ex-ante certain that appropriation art-or any avant-garde art that challenges copyright law, for that matter-were only illegal, harmful infringement that retarded progress, we needn't worry about its destruction. But the Prince decisions are evocative of how easily that certainty eludes the judiciary and how drastically differently one judge may measure progress of useful arts than every work of Appropriation Art is infringing by its very nature, and that they have an absolute duty to investigate each such work in their collections. 
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another. Given that inherent uncertainty, does increased liability for patrons automatically tighten copyright law's grip on artistic innovation? Or imagine, charitably, that museums with the funds for litigation do decide to take a chance on appropriation art. Which artist wins the lottery? The unknown artist creating challenging, often misunderstood work or the celebrity fixture trumpeted as the mainstay of an artistic movement? Who is more likely to be the easier legal case to defend, supported by expert testimony from distinguished art critics and decades of reviews? Who is more likely to attract record attendees willing to pay full-price suggested donations? And who is less likely to recycle work or motifs he has been trotting out for decades? In this sense, even museums whose institutional commitment to art trumps concerns over legal liability may subtly prioritize older, established artists at the expense of avant-garde art.
On appeal, Cariou's lawyers asserted confidently that "[a]s for museums, their display of art 'for nonprofit educational purposes' is explicitly protected by the fair use statute."l72 But the issue is hardly so clear-cut. Do museum gift-shop tchotchkes bearing images of artwork have an educational purpose? Do creatorthemed exhibitions intended to attract paying customers qualify as nonprofit? And for that matter, why should museums alone qualify for a nonprofit, educational exception? Gagosian turned a profit from "Canal Zone," true, but he also offered free access to an impressive collection of cutting edge artwork from a worldrenowned contemporary artist; the Museum of Modern Art charges $25 a head 73 to view its collection of Prince artworks (all of which, at the time of this writing, sit in storage).1
74
The vicarious liability standard brings its own set of novel pressures. In finding Gagosian vicariously liable, Judge Batts singled out the unique relationship between Gagosian and Prince,
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designed to incentivize the efficient production of innovative works through economic means alone, absent any higher, intrinsic motivation emanating from the artist herself. If muddled fair use doctrine and expanded liability for patrons negatively affect the economic motivations of artists, they run counter to the copyright system and should be reformed.
Further, the accusation of infringement works its chilling effect before the official commencement of courtroom proceedings. Cariou delivered his cease-and-desist letter to Prince a month before filing his complaint with the Southern District and more than two years before the court would announce a liability standard that increased the number of defendants on the hook for liability.178 Post-Prince, in the Second Circuit, at least, even if an artist is judgment-proof, her gallerist can be held jointly and severally liable. With damages now extractable from double the amount of defendants, how many more cease-and-desist letters will potential plaintiffs take a chance on writing? Contemporary artists have already reported practices of "trolling" by specialized law firms that comb the Internet for possible copyright infringement and send cease-and-desist letters to artists. 179 Again, were it ex-ante certain that these artists had infringed, such behavior would be acceptable, and perhaps even commendable, as a vindication of the rights of the original artist whose works were used without permission. But Cariou was no doubt personally certain that Prince had infringed his copyright when he sent his cease-and-desist letter. Had Prince buckled to that pressure, the world--or at the very least, consumers of Prince's artworkwould have been deprived of what the Second Circuit panel confidently determined, four years after Cariou's original letter, to be "jarring works ... [both] 
VI. THE CREATIVE EFFECT OF COURT-ORDERED DESTRUCTION
When Judge Wallace took the Second Circuit majority panel to task for failing to remand the entire "Canal Zone" series to the district court for a fair use determination under the newly announced standard, he struck at a critical flaw in the majority's opinion: there was no "principled reason" for the selective remand. Judge Wallace's point hints at a possible ulterior motive behind the panel's unexplained decision to so "confidently"' 82 declare transformative the vast majority of the Prince paintings at the appellate level: anxiety over the public's perception of the court's cultural literacy.
The sense that the panel was being watched by a wider-thannormal audience, that it "plainly understood the importance and the artistic significance of this case," according to Professor Amy Adler,1 83 appeared throughout oral argument and the subsequent opinion. At argument, Judge Parker all but rebuked Judge Batts as a philistine when he declared her injunction "something that would appeal to the Huns or the Taliban"l 84 and elicited laughter from the courtroom when he joked amongst a downtown Manhattan public that "Prince was selling to a wealthier crowd, and on this side of the river."' 8 5 The opinion, meanwhile, references celebrities, public figures, entertainers, and models invited to the "Canal Zone" opening (whether any actually showed up remains uncertain) and takes pains to communicate to the district court and the wider public the panel's informed understanding of Prince's significance as a contemporary artist, declaring that no matter what the legal status of the remanded paintings, destruction of Prince's art particularly "would be improper and against the public interest. would destroying only some of the infringing Prince paintings reduce the derivative market collector's interest in purchasing one? How would it make the collector any more likely to purchase a Cariou photograph? It could conceivably increase the price of the Prince painting to prohibitive heights, thereby increasing the relative attractiveness of the Cariou photo. But judging by the million-dollar gulf between the works, the hypothetical collector interested in both cheaper Cariou originals and more expensive Prince derivatives would remain undeterred-or perhaps even more likely to purchase the Prince painting instead.1 99 Indeed, when interviewed, "Canal Zone" purchaser Adam Lindemann observed that Prince "is an artist who makes a lot of work, but these paintings are rarified, and they have a unique story." The lawsuit, and the destruction order particularly, actually increased the cultural cachet (and presumably economic value) of Lindemann's "Canal Zone" painting.
B. Destruction as a Driver ofReproduction
Court-ordered destruction also favors the losing defendant in other ways. As Prince demonstrates, it is likely to encourage the production and distribution of physical and digital copies of an infringing work, both by members of artistic communities in protest over what they perceive to be a culturally illiterate judiciary and by the legal community in preparation for counsel to art world clients on the outer limits of fair use.
At deposition, Prince complained that prior to Cariou's suit "not one review, in any magazine" had been written about "Canal 199. Rachel Corbett notes "the argument could be made that the lawsuit raises the works' cachet." Corbett, supra note 193.
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In its zeal to save the Prince paintings from physical destruction above all else, the Second Circuit panel failed to adequately examine the actual effects of court-ordered destruction. It also neglected an opportunity to rationally defend against physical destruction of works in future fair use cases, holding in the most minimal of fashions that the destruction of Prince's artwork alone would be against the public interest. Lesser-known artists, whose works have yet to collect the accolades and vigorous defenders Prince enjoys, remain vulnerable to a fair use standard that, more than ever, depends on the eye of the beholding judge. If a certain class of person walks into an apartment and sees a huge Richter, they're going to know pretty much immediately how much that Richter is worth. If they see a medium-sized Old Master, by contrast, the financial value of the piece-not to mention its authorship-is much less obvious. As such, Old Masters are much less good at displaying the wealth of their owner than Warhols and Richters are. Which has to explain at least some of the reason why Warhols and Richters are so incredibly expensive. Id 47
